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Finance, development and remittances: extending the scale of accumulation in migrant labour 
regimes 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The last decade has seen a heightened level of interest in the relationship between 
remittances and development, driven by the World Bank and other Bretton Woods 
Institutions. This has materialised in a global agenda to incorporate migrants and their 
households in commercial banking. The double significance of this policy rests in the 
financial incorporation of migrants and their households, and in the deepening 
entrenchment of the historical labour migration dynamic between sending communities 
and centres of capital. The central role of labour-power in the advance of money forms 
the core of this analysis of a contemporary market-building strategy. This article 
presents a threefold critique of the global remittance agenda, based on: (1) its 
transformative profit-driven development ideology, (2) its detachment of remittances 
from the political economy of migrant labour regimes, and (3) its dismissal of existing 
modes of remitting and uses of the funds.  
 
Keywords: Labour migration, remittances, neo-liberalism, capital accumulation, financialisation, modes of 
production 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, various organisations have tackled issues related to the important 
topic of international remittances. However, few of these reports have been devoted 
specifically to the "payment system aspects" of remittances – in effect, the practical 
realities of actually transferring money. Understanding these payment system 
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aspects is crucial to understanding remittances and to ensuring that remittance 
services are safe and efficient. 
Timothy F. Geithner, Chairman of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Michael 
U. Klein, Vice President of the World Bank (Bank for International Settlements and World Bank 
2007, iii. 
 
In order for the new transfer providers to compete with the traditional cash-to-cash 
MTOs [money transfer operators] – many of whom are long established in the UK-
Ghana market and work well with the communities – or even to carve out a corner 
of the market for themselves, the online and prepaid card providers will be reliant 
on regulatory changes taking place in Ghana and indeed a shift towards greater 
financial awareness and inclusiveness amongst beneficiaries. 
Developing Markets Associates Ltd. and Dept. for International Development (UK) 2011, 27-28. 
 
The largest recorded volumes of remittances flow from wealthier to poorer countries and are congruently 
linked in global policy with development and poverty alleviation (World Bank 2013; Ratha 2007; 
Ammassari 2006; USAID 2012; Isaacs, Vargas-Silva and Hugo 2012; Bourenane, Bourjij and Lhériau 2011). 
During the past decade, the World Bank has driven an agenda to manage remittance money transfers so that 
they are cheaper, more competitive, and foster ‘financial inclusion’ for migrants and their beneficiaries. 
This is consolidated in the ‘5 + 5’ objective of the Bank-coordinated G20 Global Remittances Working 
Group, which is to attain ‘a reduction of the global average costs of transferring remittances from the 
present 10% to 5% in 5 years through enhanced information, transparency, competition and cooperation 
with partners’ (Cirasino, Ratha et al. 2009, 5). This objective is founded on addressing the market-based 
issue of high transfer costs and inconveniences that are known to affect migrants and their beneficiaries in 
some circumstances. However, this article will show that the remittance agenda is one of contradictory 
aims and mission-creep into a (market-building as) development strategy, or the ‘deep marketisation of 
development’, by which the constitution of the market in its neoliberal form is aimed directly at the private 
sphere (Carroll 2012, 356).  The double significance of the remittance agenda rests in the societal impact of 
financially incorporating migrants and their households, and in the deepening entrenchment of the historical 
labour migration dynamic between sending communities and centres of capital. Therefore, the central role 
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of labour-power in the advance of money is at the core of this study of remittances, where it also belongs in 
broader discussions of financialisation (Fine 2007, 2).  
 
The existing academic literature on remittances and development is often authored by employees of 
international financial institutions (although not to be attributed to these institutions), appearing in journals 
such as World Economy (Acosta et al. 2006), World Development (Adams and Page 2005), 
Journal of Development Studies (Ebeke 2012) and Journal of Development Economics 
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). The findings vary but the authors engage in ‘problem-solving’ debates 
around the relationship between remittances, growth, and equality, also considering the technical barriers 
to their effectiveness. Further studies focus similarly on the technical aspects of remittances and their 
implications for the promotion of development (Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Brown 2006). Departing 
from the macroeconomic assessment of remittance flows, there is also a body of empirically rich literature 
that focuses on the dynamics of remitting and offers insight into the transnational connections between 
sender and receiver (see Findley et al. 1995; Mazzucato 2006; Pieke, Van Hear and Lindley 2007; Lindley 
2007 and Magunha, Bailey and Cliffe 2009). Further literature considers critically and holistically the 
relationship between migration, remittances and development (de Haas 2005; Skeldon 2008; Bracking 
2003). Beside Hudson’s (2008) thorough study of ‘banking the unbanked’ and Cross’ earlier (2008) 
examination of the neoliberal approach to remittances, critical analysis specifically of the global remittance 
agenda is lacking. This article foregrounds remittance policy within the broader understanding that it is a 
neo-liberal project of financialisation - the expansion of the frontier of financial accumulation - that aims to 
construct markets and integrate economies into global capitalist markets (Mader 2013, 6).  
 
Beyond placing the agenda in the context of the global political economy, further questions emerge about 
the types of continuity and transformation that the financial absorption of remittances aims for and is 
beginning to achieve. The implications of the agenda are as expansive and profound as other contemporary 
expressions of global capitalism, such as the major land and agricultural investments that have been covered 
in depth in this journal (Vol. 10, No. 1) and elsewhere. In working towards a deeper understanding of the 
remittance agenda, this article presents a threefold critique, based on: (1) its transformative profit-driven 
development ideology, (2) its detachment of remittances from the political economy of migrant labour 
regimes, and (3) its dismissal of existing modes of remitting and uses of funds.  
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Because remittance policy is associated with the alleviation of poverty alongside macroeconomic 
development, this article is primarily concerned with south-north labour migrations. It will acknowledge 
and highlight some of the complexities of migrant labour, whilst also developing a theoretically and 
empirically grounded general understanding of migration patterns against which the development capacity 
of remittances can be understood. The primary aim is not, however, to understand the potential of 
remittances, but instead to put them in perspective.  
 
Firstly, I will briefly locate remittance policy in the trajectory of late capitalism, showing how remittances 
are approached as an expanding market that is seen to constitute development. Secondly, this article looks 
more broadly at the role of capital accumulation in international migration regimes. In understanding the 
significance of geographically separating the migrant’s community from the host economy, this structural 
approach to migration and remittances brings to bear the limitations of isolating the flow of money from the 
circumstances of migrating. Thirdly, this article considers the implications of neoliberal management of 
remittance flows by looking closely at existing and historical modes of transferring and spending money, 
drawing particularly on Senegalese household experiences. In speaking to the themes in this Special Issue, it 
finally reflects briefly on the level and type of engagement that exists between remittance market-building 
and civil society. Beyond considering the (ir)relevance of the premise and prescriptions of global remittance 
policy to the livelihoods of migrants, households and communities, the ethnographic detail in this article 
also highlights the analytical importance of locating the sending of remittances in the context of the wider 
displacement of labour. This is to say that remittance-senders are - often momentarily - ‘elevated’ into 
exploitative wage labour as successful members of a much larger group of people who are underemployed, 
threatened by hunger and criminalised. These conditions are the sine qua non of migrant labour and 
consequentially remittances. The continuous role of this dynamic in global capitalism therefore undermines 
the prospects for remittances to be ‘harnessed’ or ‘tapped’ to bring wider benefits of development or 
poverty alleviation, though they are naturally well directed towards these ends.  
 
 
 
I. The remittance agenda and market-building as development 
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Research reports mushroomed in the early 2000s that examined remittances as a development strategy. 
They have been written and commissioned by international development, finance and policy institutions, 
including the World Bank (Ratha 2003); the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) 
(Addy et al. 2003), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Bouhga-Hagbe 2004), the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2005), the International Labour Office (ILO) 
(Ammassari 2006) and the Migration Policy Institute (Ratha 2007). Global remittances increased from 
around US$30 billion annually in the early 1990s to $318 billion in 2007, with three-quarters of this 
amount directed towards lower-middle-income and low-income developing countries (Vargas-Lundius et 
al. 2008: 14). To developing countries alone, official remittance flows reached an estimated $401 billion in 
2012, surpassing the global sum for 2007, and this figure is projected to reach $515 billion in 2015 (World 
Bank 2013: 1). This dramatic rise of reported emigrant transfers does not entirely correspond with the real 
aggregated volume of migrants’ earnings that are sent home; instead it is linked with improved 
measurement and closer scrutiny of remittance flows, reduction of the transfer costs, and depreciation of 
the US dollar (Ratha 2007, 2). The sum of remittances is likely, therefore, to continue expanding as 
monitoring improves and as domestic remittance flows and south-south transactions also come to light 
(Castaldo, Deshingkar and McKay 2012). The gains from international migration in the global south 
consequently represent a growing portion of GDP compared with official development assistance, private 
debt and the fluctuating flows of direct foreign investment (Ammassari 2006: 18; World Bank 2013).  
 
A senior economist at the World Bank, Dilip Ratha (2007), developed the International Remittances 
Agenda in a report for the Migration Policy Institute. The overall policy recommendation is that the 
‘development community’ should ‘make remittance services cheaper and more convenient and indirectly 
leverage these flows to improve the financial access of migrants, their beneficiaries, and the financial 
intermediaries in the origin countries’ (Ratha 2007, 1). The Agenda promotes the implementation of 
monitoring, analysis and projection; retail payment systems; financial access for individuals or households; 
and the leveraging of remittances for capital market access of financial institutions or countries. Ratha 
argues that the development community should achieve these ends through deregulation, rather than direct 
the money towards taxation or specific development uses (Ratha 2007: 12). A move towards the 
formalisation of remittances through financial services was also promoted in the International Migration 
Policy Programme, an inter-agency group that includes the UK DfID, the World Bank, the International 
Labour Organisation and the International Organisation for Migration. The report argues that 
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macroeconomic environments in developing countries may pose obstacles to remittance transfers, and that 
by entering the banking system the money becomes more secure, earns interest and makes fresh money 
available for business loans (Addy et al. 2003: 14–15).  
 
The new developmentalist approach to remittances therefore focuses on their ‘sheer volume, stable growth 
over time, and anti-cyclical nature’ (Addy et al. 2003, 3). Recent studies have explored the relationship 
between remittances and the global financial crisis. A working paper from the IMF concludes that African 
nations have been cushioned if they receive most of their remittances from the region, but they will gain in 
the longer run if they send more labour outside Africa (Barajas et al. 2010). The World Bank recognises the 
instability of labour markets in destination countries and that there are political pressures to reduce the 
amount of immigration, which might depress remittance flows (Ratha and Silwal 2012: 2–3). However, a 
further chapter in a World Bank volume asks whether remittances to sub-Saharan Africa are a source of 
resilience or vulnerability: it concludes the former because remittances are ‘relatively stable’ (Naudé and 
Bezuidenhout 2012: 346). The overarching logic is that remittances are an expanding market, which in 
global capitalism presents the enormous prospect not only to channel migrants’ money through financial 
intermediaries, but also to incorporate receiving households in international finance.  
 
A parallel logic with the similar consequences of bringing remittances into formal channels is found in post-
9/11 attempts to monitor and control international flows of money. This led the US government to close 
down as much as three-quarters of the hawala networks, often serviced by individuals, that transmit value 
to Pakistan, India, Somalia, Afghanistan and other countries. (Pieke, van Hear and Lindley 2007). Hawala 
networks emerged in the modes of exchange and value transfer that were particular to merchants and 
migrant groups in and around the Indian Ocean, prior to the colonial period. This is a complex system that 
is largely Muslim-controlled and non-interest-bearing, based on trust. It is rooted in historical commercial 
banking operations to finance long-distance trade. The transactions amount to a transfer of debt through 
agents, using a network of reciprocity that is known for its efficiency and  low costs (Ballard 2005, 326). 
Revealing the cooperative relationship between security and development agendas, the Bank for 
International Settlements and the World Bank (2007, 23-4) argues that in the prohibitive political context, 
it is advantageous to require such informal remittance services to conform to financial regulation rather than 
outlawing them, because it increases competition. 
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The expansion of the formal financial services industry has been widely understood as necessary for 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Financial intermediaries supposedly contribute to the 
development trajectory by influencing and mobilising savings, channelling savings into investment, 
promoting the mobility of resources, encouraging the expansion of the market economy, and by 
transforming traditional modes of production and the associated social relations into modern forms 
(Lawrence 2006, 2-3). However, in transforming ‘the composition and functionality of the economy as a 
productive space’, the role of finance in development departs from that of intermediation, instead seeking 
to restructure economies to the advantage of financial investors (Mader 2013, 6; Froud, Johal and Williams 
2002, 120). This expansive vision for finance is evident in remittance policy: the earlier-quoted report on 
UK-Ghana remittance corridors (DMA and DfID 2011), for instance, reveals a higher logic that precludes 
the aim to reduce transaction costs for migrants. The report summarised that the existing remittance 
corridor was indeed competitively priced and reliable,  but it was ‘traditional by nature’ and the profit 
margins, as well as the costs, were low, so ‘moving forward changes are needed in both the UK and 
Ghanaian market in order to take advantage of new business models’ (ibid., p. 2).  
 
To encourage migrants to enter the banking system, ‘financial education’ is promoted (Ratha 2007, 12). 
One contribution to this policy emerges in remittance price comparison websites that are variously led by 
the World Bank Group, development ministries, international banking organisations and development 
consultancy firms.1 On the receiving end, ‘financial literacy’ is promoted through further public-private 
partnerships. The International Labour Organisation, for instance, recommends a ‘financial education and 
counselling program’ in Senegal, to be managed in a partnership between NGOs and financial institutions 
and with involvement from migrant associations. It is directed at remittance recipients and results in ‘the 
conversion from remittance client to bank client through the cross sale of financial products’ (Orozco et al. 
2010: 33).  
 
This set of policies is consistent with the contemporary phase of ‘market building as a development project 
under late capitalism’ (Carroll 2012, 351). This phase succeeds the post-Washington consensus strategy of 
‘bringing the state back in’: 
                                                     
1 See: http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org (World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation); 
http://www.enviacentroamerica.org (World Bank, the Center for Latin America Monetary Studies, and the 
Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank); 
http://www.moneymove.org/English/httpdocs/services.cfm (Developing Markets Associates Ltd.); 
http://www.envoidargent.fr (French Development Agency). 
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‘… the incomplete constitution of capitalism in a particular image requires energetic “remedial” 
attempts to push forms of “knowledge” (via technical assistance), “build” particular institutions and 
foster whole new spheres of private sector activity via risk mitigation and new instruments of 
financial support (often directly to the private sector). Not simply constrained to state-oriented (pro-
market) reform, as in the not-too-distant past, these new efforts - reflecting shifts in the global 
political economy and a concomitant new politics of development [ … ] - work variously 
on, through and around the state, with each reform component seemingly referencing and 
complementing the other’ (ibid.)  
 
This amounts to the deepening of neoliberalism, which retains the post-Washington Consensus 
preoccupation with fixing ‘informationally-based market imperfections’ (Fine 2001, 7) but is more likely to 
localise risk to individuals and communities. The incorporation of migrants’ ‘idle’ money into global 
development is further explained as a defensive, problem-solving approach to deeper issues of poverty, 
inequality and underdevelopment on the part of the IFIs and national development agencies (Hudson 2008, 
316). Its benefits to users of financial services are restricted, however, by the relationship between the 
credit system and capitalist accumulation, in which ‘the credit system derives its fundamental design from 
relations of accumulation but also promotes development of those relations’ (Aybar and Lapavitsas 2001: 
38). The financial inclusion programme operates within the country’s social, political and historical 
context, not merely in a world of imperfect information, and in remittance policy it is the less powerful 
countries that are targeted by virtue of the role of labour migration in their political economies.  
 
II. The dynamics of labour migration 
 
Having outlined the way that neoliberal global policy frames remittances, the aim is now to show how and 
why the global remittance agenda needs to be understood more broadly within the historical relationship 
between labour and capitalism. Labour-power has the twofold character of producing value as other 
commodities do, while it also creates and forms the value of commodities (Marx 1867/1970: 46). As I have 
discussed elsewhere (Cross 2013b, 211-12), capitalist economies seek to pay the lowest possible cost for 
labour. This is achieved by other means than migration, including extending the work time of the national 
population, inducing large-scale unemployment to push wage rates down, or moving production to less 
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developed regions (not possible for all sectors of the economy) (Harvey 2003, 141). However, what 
distinguishes migrant labour from other types of cheap labour is that the cost of renewal is externalised to 
sending economies (Burawoy 1980). They reproduce, nourish, house, train and habituate workers, 
relieving the host country of this cost (Cohen 1987).  Conversely, in the host economy, migrants receive 
subsistence wages but are excluded from receiving ‘indirect wages’ in the form of family allowance, 
pensions, unemployment benefits, sickness cover and often healthcare. The separation of the means of 
renewal from subsistence is possible because imperialism established ‘organic relations’ between capitalist 
and ‘domestic’, or non-capitalist, economies: subsistence agriculture might continue outside of the sphere 
of production, where the surplus value is created, but by supplying workers, the domestic economy belongs 
to capitalism’s sphere of circulation (Meillassoux 1975, 95). This would lead to temporary and rotating 
forms of labour migration that simultaneously preserve and exploit the domestic subsistence economy 
(Meillassoux 1975, 109 – 111). This is how capitalism emerges as the dominant, but not the only mode 
of production.Patterns of migrant labour are the consequence of primitive accumulation, the ‘historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’ so that the social means of subsistence and 
of production transform to capital and producers become wage labourers (Marx 1867/1970, 714-15). This 
separation is ‘reproduced on a continually extending scale’ (ibid.) and is a coercive process in that workers’ 
‘willingness’ to enter labour markets and their supposed freedom to circulate emerges when starvation 
looms (Fine and Saad-Filho 2004, 81; also Sassen 1988, 33). Migrants have often successfully integrated 
themselves in the global economy. They have sometimes gained property and means of production, and 
therefore are no longer motivated to struggle for the lowest possible reward. This indicates why primitive 
accumulation was not completed, but instead processes of global capitalism reproduce the separation of the 
producer and his/her means of production in a continuous geographical expansion and the appetite for 
displaced workers persists (Marx 1867/1970: 714; Perelman 1983; Fine and Saad-Filho 2004).  
 
A further dimension of cheapness, beyond the logic of geographical distance, has persisted in forms of 
‘unfree labour’, by which political-legal restrictions are ‘specifically intended to restrict the circulation of 
certain categories of labour-power within the labour market’ (Miles 1987, 33). As capitalist economies have 
industrialised and continued to grow and compete, there has been a consistent role for the most restrictive 
and cheap forms of commodified labour because historical relations of domination preclude the 
improvement of wage relations. The varied contributions of slavery, debt bondage, and indentured or 
contract labour to capitalist production, alongside the ‘free’ forms, have determined its ‘compatibility’ 
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with, and the necessity for, unfree forms of wage labour (Miles 1987, Cohen 2006, 17). European colonial 
regimes from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries brought lasting and divisive social orders and means 
of resource management to the colonies in the Americas, Asia and Africa. The expansion of empire was 
accompanied and fuelled by the Atlantic slave trade, in which producers and slaves were commodified, 
becoming an item of exchange by force. Subsequently, as Europeans settled in the New World, from the early 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, as many as 30 million indentured workers from China and the 
Indian subcontinent contributed to industrial expansion, replacing slave labour in the Caribbean and also 
generating wealth in South-East Asian plantations. After World War II, labour movements were directed 
from the colonies to Europe (Papastergiadis 2000, 22–7; Castles and Miller 2003, 51-5).  
 
There has been a continuous need for the highly industrialised countries to stabilise new generations of low-
cost labour, which are not an incidental product of uneven development, but are also managed to meet the 
needs of the labour market. Cammack (2008) has described this as a ‘universal convergence on 
competitiveness’, by which the OECD, the World Bank and national development agencies are committed 
to global labour mobility in support of competitiveness and this produces a ‘global proletariat’.  In the 
contemporary era, Mexico and the US are leading sending and receiving countries respectively and broader 
‘south-north’ migration patterns persist among others, including large-scale labour imports in Western 
Asia’s oil-exporting countries. These movements assume restricted and concentrated forms as border 
policies are selectively enforced (Sassen 1988, 41). They are broadly manageable because in its modern 
form, unfree labour mobility is the outcome of a contradictory but interconnected system of constraints 
that develop as the outcome of economic dispossession, illegalisation, border control, labour exploitation 
and processes of underdevelopment (Cross 2013a).  
 
In spite of the advances in transportation and communication that are associated with globalisation’s recent 
history, the increase in migrant stock in relation to population growth has risen merely from 2.2 percent of 
the world population in 1970 to 2.7 percent in 2005 (this latter figure excludes the nationality changes of 
those who had lived in the former Soviet Union) (UNDP 2009, 146).  
 
While these statistics are limited by the invisibility and varied timeframes of many forms of migration, they 
still necessitate consideration of what happens to those who stay, who are economically coerced to migrate 
but prevented from doing so. In Senegal, clandestine emigration is commonly considered reckless, yet the 
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well-known ‘Barça mba Barzakh’ (‘Barcelona or the afterlife’ in Wolof) motto for would-be migrants in 
Dakar should be taken more literally than as an exuberant desire to enter ‘the West’. Here and in 
neighbouring countries, households faced the loss of land through commodification and a later devaluation 
of the franc CFA in the 1980s-90s era of structural adjustment, at which time remittances from Europe 
grew in significance. Crisis has persisted in the industrial and agricultural sectors, leading to unemployment 
levels upwards of 40%, reaching 80% in one of Senegal’s primary districts of clandestine migration to the 
Canary Islands (Bouilly 2008, 15). The global food price hikes of 2007-8 reverberated strongly in migrants’ 
and stayers’ explanations of ‘illegal’ migration.  
 
Furthermore, the financial system was cited as an important cause of dispossession, by which it would not 
be possible to save money for family welfare expenses with a local wage and consequentially, loans would 
be taken out that required the mortgaging of houses and other possessions (Cross 2013b, 206-7). This again 
alludes to the importance of understanding capitalism as a dynamic process rather than a historical stage, 
meaning that colonial forms of exchange repeat themselves: it remains that – separated from the means of 
production – the producer is forced to ‘buy back provisions during a time of need at higher prices and on 
credit’ and this ‘encourages speculation and the formation of a parasitic social class’ (Meillassoux 1974, 31).   
People can ‘make do’, but it is emigrants who are able to ‘earn a living’, while stayers are unable to find 
stable work and will struggle with the basic necessities. This is not peculiar to impoverished communities in 
Africa: a detailed study of ‘migration fever’ in a Guatemalan town reveals an overwhelming number of 
farms that cannot support a family, creating the necessity for heavy borrowing with land titles and housing 
as collateral (Stoll 2013, 8). It shows how capitalism not only encourages people to take risks, but also 
pressures them to do so in the competitive scramble for a better future. When remittances drive further 
financialisation, the necessity for families to gamble assets, livelihoods and lives intensifies. This insight 
reinforces the importance of moving beyond empiricism to understand the passionate declarations of 
hopeful migrant workers in any part of the world that is subject to development and ‘poverty alleviation’ 
strategies (ibid., 192). Modern forms of accumulation - the suppression of local forms of production and 
consumption; imperial appropriation of assets (including natural resources); the monetisation of exchange 
and taxation; national debt; and the credit system (Harvey 2003, 145) – lead people willingly, even 
desperately, into an illegal labour market that often rejects them, particularly in times of global recession. 
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This global historical perspective presents a grounding challenge to the modern tendency to reify the choice 
and agency of migrant workers out of context, or to view ‘mobility’ as a cultural phenomenon that is the 
outcome of advances in globalisation (Cross 2013a, 11/14). This is not to be deterministic about migrants’ 
trajectories or to dismiss the successes that follow epic journeys into the unknown, but is instead to draw 
attention both to the underlying circumstances of the decision to migrate out of low-income economies, 
and to the reproduction of an unstable livelihood (see Riddell 1981, 372-3), which often fails.         
 
Fine (2007, 4) warns against the use of Marx’s theory of unemployment, or the ‘reserve army of labour’, to 
interpret contemporary notions of poverty and unemployment in the developing world because Marx 
suggests that various circumstances modify its workings. This general law, however, offers at the very least 
a helpful metaphor by which migrant workers are situated in the wider populations from which they 
originate. The reserve army of labour consists of three components: the ‘floating’ section of those who are 
unemployed but likely to be reincorporated in the workforce; the ‘latent’ section of people who have never 
been wage-labourers but could potentially join the workforce; and finally the ‘Lazarus-like’ layer or 
‘surplus population’ for whom particular circumstances prevent the selling of labour-power. The extent of 
the Lazarus layer, alongside the industrial reserve army more generally, rises with the extent of social 
wealth andcorresponds with the level of ‘official pauperism’, creating the general law of capitalist 
accumulation (ibid.). What may be taken from this principle for the evaluation of the remittance agenda is 
firstly that migrant workers who are sending remittances, by some combination of luck, opportunity, access 
to resources, determination or other cause, belong to a more fortunate section of a larger population. 
Secondly, as a result, a meaningful consideration of the relationship between remittances and development 
must go beyond the benefits for the migrant’s beneficiaries and the finance industry, to assess the broader 
implications of remittances for poverty and inequality. 
  
III. Remittances: channels, uses and impact 
 
A USAID report (2012, 2) considers that remittances have ‘untapped potential’ to go beyond financial 
transfers and ‘to extend along the whole spectrum of human development’. Similarly, the President of the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (Nwanze 2013) argues that in the $260 billion of 
remittances to developing countries in Asia, ‘the enormous potential returns for society have not been 
realised’. The global remittance agenda represents a resurgence of the optimism that was attached to 
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migrant transfers in the 1950s and 1960s, during the ‘golden age’ of migration, when postwar Northern 
Europe continued to draw on labour from the south and the risks of migrating were comparatively low. 
However, this resurgence is part and parcel of a financialising approach to development, shifting from the 
earlier state-centric focus on migrants’ investments in enterprise towards a market-building logic (de Haas 
2007, 3).  
 
As explained earlier, the primary concern here with the new approach to remittances is the presumption 
that development and poverty alleviation would be encouraged if migrant workers managed their money 
better. The funds, now that they are visible to policymakers, apparently present a blank slate to the 
International Development community to foster growth through various types of ‘financial innovation’. 
This amounts to a denial of the severity and persistence of underdevelopment and a denigration of 
households’ long-running spending behaviours in this setting (see below). Characteristic of late capitalism, a 
singular, narrow and universal trajectory of development is presumed which denies the existence of 
alternatives. While critical of the outcome of capitalist globalisation in Africa, Ferguson (2006) also warns 
against the reactionary approach to a single-minded modernisation. He importantly points out that it is 
appealing to recognise that there are ‘alternative modernities’, but ‘once we give up the benchmark of a 
singular modernity, then what does the term mean, analytically? If Cameroonians practicing witchcraft are 
in fact being “modern” … then one wonders: What would count as non-modern?’ (Ferguson 2006, 31). 
With this in mind, is incorporation in ‘global’ (but non-Islamic) finance the necessary route to modernity? 
Will deregulated remittance flows create a ‘win-win’ situation for migrants and owners of capital? The 
suggestion is more that of a zero-sum game, in that the liberalisation of financial markets represents ‘the 
support of financial interests and activities against those of others’ (Fine 2007, 11). This section will indeed 
argue that there are meaningful modern alternatives to financialisation. 
 
The existence of remittances, let alone the way they function, presents a paradoxical challenge to the 
methodological individualism that underpins the construction of the capitalist political economy. 
Neoclassical migration theory did not previously recognise them because it was anticipated, for example by 
Todaro, that the benefits of labour migration were found in the equalisation of wage levels and 
consequentially migration would cease once this essential stage of development was fulfilled (see de Haas 
2007, 4). Policy has now shifted towards institutionalising the flow of remittances under the acceptance that 
they are growing. Econometric models have reappeared in migration literature that aim to compute 
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‘motives’ for remitting, including altruism (‘pure’ and ‘impure’), insurance against risk, the repayment of 
loans, exchange of services, and the aspiration to inherit, contributing to debates around the degree of 
‘altruism’ and ‘self-interest’ or ’selfishness’ (of the migrant and/or recipients) (Lucas and Stark 1985, 904; 
Rapoport and Docquier 2005, 10; Melkonyan and Grigorian 2012, 1037). This approach to remittances 
ultimately reduces the migrant to a rational egoist whether s/he is judged altruistic or selfish because the 
modelling is based on individual actions and desires.  
 
A more objective explanation concerning West Africa shows that migrants’ efforts are made on behalf of 
their villages or districts as a reflection of economic considerations such as previous investments in the 
migrant and the preservation of the community through times of struggle (Potts 2011, 39). Patterns have 
emerged by which different family members move back and forth between local agriculture, urban wage 
labour and overseas jobs, contributing to village social resources.  The sending of remittances shows 
collective action at different stages of the process, by which ‘users of a common-pool resource organise 
themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules’ (Orstrom 2000, 148). These actions are 
frequently channelled through the informal sector, which in Sub-Saharan Africa includes moneylenders, 
who can be traders, landlords and pawnbrokers, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs, 
including susu in Ghana, esusu in Nigeria, tontines in Francophone Africa, and upatu in Tanzania) and 
informal arrangements among relatives and friends, often at zero interest rates (Lawrence 2006, 10).  
 
In Senegal, the tontine organised by the Collective of Women for the Fight Against Clandestine 
Emigration, formed by mothers of migrants lost at sea, has provided emergency funds for the reintegration 
of repatriated migrants and to prevent others from leaving (Cross 2013b, 207; Bouilly 2008). In Catalonia, 
there are tontines of up to 70 members, which include Guinean Women of Lleida, Gambian Women in 
Mataró, Mixed Cameroonians in L’Hospitalet and Senegalese Women of la Segarra (Sow 2007, 40). The 
Senegalese Mouride brotherhoods have a history of setting up migration and work networks and facilitating 
remittance channels (Diouf 2000; Lawrence 2006, 11). In less fixed networks, West African remittance-
senders in Barcelona and other towns in Catalonia pool and exchange resources, including food, 
accommodation, child care and work permits. This makes it possible to send significant funds to the 
household out of a low wage. It was explained to me that conditions of life in Europe were unimportant 
compared to changes to the family home in Africa: spending on water, electricity and other basic needs is 
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money wasted, while cash and goods sent to Africa are an investment (Cross 2013a, 116; see Tall 2008, 
53).  
 
Known as ‘aid which reaches its destination’, remittances have helped households to overcome crises 
(Sakho 2007). A report compiled in Dakar’s Université Cheikh Anta Diop found that around 2.5 million 
Senegalese remit approximately 600 billion CFA (€914.7 million) and this affects almost 70 percent of 
households. The majority of this money comes from Europe and the US, representing a quarter of imports 
and a third of exports (Sakho 2007, 11; Cross 2013c). It is estimated that half of the money is sent by 
formal channels and half informal (Sakho 2007, 11, 16). There is strong evidence across Senegal’s diverse 
migrant groups that the money has been directed towards development, investment and saving as much as 
possible. Remittances have enabled the development of property, building, construction and artisanal 
sectors, creating labour demand. Emigrants constitute half of the proprietors in some quarters of Dakar 
(Grand Dakar and Parcelles Assaines) and contributed to 60 per cent of construction in Kebemer between 
2002 and 2007 (Sakho 2007, 12). Transfers from emigrants have covered expenses for healthcare and 
education, provided basic household needs and have allowed families to acquire land and tools for income 
generation.  Fall noted the construction of a ‘life shop’ in the village of Sédo-Sébé, funded by remittances, 
where essential goods were available at lower cost and could offset frequent stock market ruptures (2008: 
207). More broadly, however, remittances are less likely to end patterns of labour migration in rural areas 
that experience a greater severity of poverty (Diagne and Diané 2008, 13). In rural Sahel zones, 97 per cent 
of remittance funds are used for household expenses and thus are said to have ameliorated the food crisis 
(Willem 2008, 295). At the same time, one migrant from the northern region of Podor in Senegal 
illustrated the critical level of dependence as she explained to me that: ‘Many people in the village are 
eating only the remittances . . . they live on the remittances but some don’t have anyone to give them 
money. These people are eating only little.’ (Cross 2013c).  
 
There are a number of challenges to the viability of directing remittances towards development. If we put 
aside the contemporary limitations to migrating overseas and isolate the remittance flows, still a more 
complex picture emerges than a simple transfer of wealth from north to south, or west to east. Castles and 
Kosack (1973, 418-20) noted towards the end of the ‘golden age of migration’ that high levels of 
remittances from Northern Europe towards the peripheral countries of Southern Europe and North Africa 
did not alter the balance of payments situation in these latter countries over time. Workers were not 
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leaving in sufficient numbers to alleviate unemployment problems or to raise wages enough to stimulate 
growth. Ultimately, the ‘development aid’ was moving from the poorer to the wealthier countries. This 
phenomenon would be magnified in the contemporary era. This is because Spain among the other 
peripheral countries had been a ‘labour-frontier’ country for Europe, distinguishable from many of the 
‘labour-reserve’ countries that contemporary policy is concerned with. As discussed previously, the labour-
reserve, unlike the labour-frontier, does not engage fully in capitalist relations of production and this 
restricts movement for workers (Skeldon 1997, 145).  
 
More recently, economic reports on behalf of the IMF and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have 
found respectively that remittances are negatively correlated with GDP growth and that they have a strong 
impact on increasing inequality. The IMF report noted that ‘remittances do not appear to be intended to 
serve as capital for economic development, but as compensation for poor economic performance’ (Chami 
et al. 2005, 77). In the latter study, it was concluded that ‘international remittances have a strong, 
statistically significant impact on increasing inequality in Africa’ (Anyanwu 2011, 9). This was based on data 
from five eight-year windows between 1960 and 2006. The report argued that this happened because the 
remitters’ households were not poor in the first place. It is also likely that the smaller remitters will move 
through informal and less detectable channels, to a greater number of households even if the quantities are 
lower. In this respect, research into the local dynamics of remittances and inequality have also been useful 
alongside the macroeconomic studies. Bracking (2003, 267) related inequality to the phenomenon in which 
remittance-receiving households undermine the spending power of households that do not receive 
remittances. Similarly, Bertrand argues that in Senegal, the accumulation of migrants’ savings has intensified 
social relations, reflecting the ‘paradox of resource abundance’ (cited in Tall 2008, 52; Fall 2008, 205). 
This problem does not, however, feature significantly in global remittance policy and it is argued in this 
context that, ‘countries have to learn to live with these persistent flows’ because it is expensive to sterilise 
their impact (Ratha 2007, 7). 
 
In sum, remittances are an important, often necessary, source of income in receiving households and they 
move in significant volumes, yet they also are likely to intensify inequalities. This is a persistent problem 
between sending and receiving economies. It is also widely noted at the local level, especially in low-
income countries, although particular instances show that ‘domestic’ communities that are outside the 
capitalist sphere of production can find ways to address this issue within the constraints of their economies. 
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The remittance agenda, in aiming to ‘enhance’ the modes of remitting, is poverty alleviation at its 
narrowest if it takes its idealised form. It offers at best nothing practical in overcoming local inequalities. 
The assumption is simply that competing financial institutions will alleviate poverty at the same time as 
generating profit and that those who are not participating in this path to development lack knowledge. The 
ideological dimension of the financialisation project prevails, meaning that it presents ‘special interests as 
the exclusive or general interest, or vice-versa, and as inevitable, unavoidable, natural even, TINA’, 
featuring the ‘8 Cs’ of being ‘constructed, construed, contested, collective, contradictory, contextual, 
closed, and chaotic’ (Fine 2007, 11, 12). This project of financial incorporation sustains an existing point of 
tension within labour regimes, which emerges in the continuous and chaotic geographical expansion and 
deepening of capital, as in low-income regions it is migrant workers’ separation from the capitalist economy 
that brings them to sell labour-power in distant labour markets and their incorporation that limits the flow 
of cheap labour. The role of this turbulent dynamic in capitalist development limits the extent and quality of 
potential incorporation of the ‘labouring poor’ (Bush 2007).  
 
The global remittance agenda has begun to take material form by which it co-opts, or rather ‘teaches’, parts 
of civil society as the space of earners of money. If in Africa’s postcolonial era, the nation-state was 
associated positively with modernity, democracy, development and progress, while society was ‘tribal and 
primordial’; then neoliberal economic and political adjustments reversed these paradigms as ‘civil society’ 
became supposedly dynamic and progressive, keeping the venal state in check (Ferguson 2006, 99).  As the 
sphere that is ‘sandwiched between the patriarchal family and the universal state’ (Hegel/ Mamdani, cited 
in Ferguson 2007, 92), civil society provided a means of working around the state in the reforms of the 
Washington Consensus and beyond. In the era of market-building as development, however, the global 
remittance agenda aims for transformation directly at the household or individual level. The direct route to 
communities and individuals is enhanced by the Western expansion of security and control, which provides 
development finance institutions with a legal mechanism for undermining and controlling parallel channels 
of money. To dig up the tired critique of Development from the era of structural adjustment, the direction 
is ‘top-down’, deploying civil society as a conduit while global change also enables this level of engagement 
to be bypassed. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
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This article has undoubtedly raised as many questions as answers and it is hoped that the financial 
incorporation of migrant labourers and their households might be analysed in future from a range of critical 
perspectives, on different scales and through close examination of different cases. What is important is that 
the focus moves away from the way remittances contribute to growth and development, and how good 
migrants and recipients are at using them, as is the tendency in much IFI-linked academic literature on the 
subject. Instead, the wider circumstances of sending remittances, the ways that remittance-sending 
illuminates, recreates and challenges contemporary relations between high- and low-income economies, 
and the implications and eventual outcomes of ‘harnessing’ this money in financial markets, are all 
interesting questions. I aim in these final paragraphs to draw out some insights in this direction. 
 
The first claim in this article was that the remittance agenda adopts a profit-driven approach to 
development. While there are a range of motives in the formulation of neoliberal policies, it has been 
demonstrated here that the aim to reduce the transaction costs of remittances for migrants is subordinated 
to the expansion of financial markets and therefore, they are not harmonious aims. This is the outcome of 
incorporating financial stakeholders in policy-making and development practice and it is consistent with 
other analyses of contemporary capitalism. This is to say that development problems are seen as a technical 
issue concerning information flows and the efficiency of markets, for which financial services surpass their 
intermediary role and seek to reconstruct economies from their own perspective. Political support allows 
them to do so at the expense of cheaper and more efficient services and their users. Secondly, this article 
linked remittance-sending with the historical relationship between migrant labour and capitalism. 
Remittances are the raison d’être of labour migration and IFIs understand them in aggregate form as a 
continuous and growing flow of funds, hence their ‘stability’. However,  the funds targeted for 
development originate in labour that has been displaced by modern forms of dispossession, and this is 
precisely why they are more significant in the poorer countries. Furthermore, if broader development 
outcomes were to be encouraged, the populations that are coerced into migrating but held back from doing 
so would also be taken into account. This understanding of the circumstances of labour migration provides 
the essential bridge between the political narrative of remittances and their potential for development. 
Thirdly, I showed that the global remittance agenda approaches remittance flows as a new opportunity for 
growth and development. This raises wider questions about development and modernity. It was pointed 
out here that in the West African case among others, there is a fundamental problem with the incorporation 
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of remittances in capitalist finance because they are built on collective actions. The cooperative social 
relations that enable remittance money to be gathered, sent, and used, such as zero-interest lending and 
transferral, or the pooling and exchange of resources, are not to be dismissed as ‘traditional’, nor is it 
romanticising to view these processes as practical. They are the rational outcome of a livelihood that would 
be otherwise unable to reverse the destruction of the household. In this case, the remittance agenda is based 
on a false problem – that remittances do not contribute enough to development because they are not 
managed efficiently – and the solution points to another means for capitalism to extract surplus from 
migrant workers. 
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